Knowledge-that, knowledge-how, consciousness and artificial intelligence
https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2023-8-1-102-109
Abstract
The article is devoted to the discussion about the relationship between knowledge and skill. This discussion arose within the critique of dualism. It is believed that dualism presupposes an intellectualism in which knowledge-how always derived from knowledge-that. The article proposes a method of distinguishing knowledgehow and knowledge-that through characteristic properties. This method allows us to draw a strict boundary between the two types of knowledge. This is followed by an explanation of the relationship between the two types of knowledge through the inclusion of knowledge-how as a necessary but not sufficient condition for knowledge-that. In the final part of the article, the principle of indistinguishability of knowledge-how among different agents is introduced, on the basis of which it is argued that the division into knowledge-how and knowledge-that works in the interests of dualism, and not vice versa, as supposed by Gilbert Ryle. This division makes sense in light of the Chinese room argument and the demonstration of the difference between humans and weak artificial intelligence.
Supporting agencies: The work is supported by a grant of the President of the Russian Federation (project MK-703.2021.2 «Naturalistic epistemology of agency and moral responsibility in the development and use of augmented intelligence technologies»).
About the Authors
T. S. Demin
Saint Petersburg Electrotechnical University «LETI»
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
DEMIN Timofey Sergeyevich, Assistant of Philosophical
Department
AuthorID (RSCI): 1085223
Saint Petersburg.
K. G. Frolov
Saint Petersburg Electrotechnical University «LETI», HSE University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
FROLOV Konstantin Gennadyevich, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Researcher at the International Laboratory for Logic, Linguistics and Formal Philosophy, Researcher of Philosophy Department
AuthorID (RSCI): 962834;
AuthorID (SCOPUS): 57195775419;
ResearcherID: Q-2302-2016;
Moscow;
Saint Petersburg.
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Review
For citations:
Demin T.S., Frolov K.G. Knowledge-that, knowledge-how, consciousness and artificial intelligence. Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity. 2023;8(1):102-109. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2023-8-1-102-109
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