Kaplan and Marti on definite descriptions: nonstandard cases of referential use
https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2024-9-3-79-82
EDN: IGCIVU
Abstract
Donnellan’s distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions has two explanations — the semantic and the pragmatic one. A version of semantic explanations was outlined by Kaplan and elaborated in detail by Marti. They construe a referentially used definite description as a proper name in the Millian sense. In a recent paper, I showed that the evidence Kaplan–Marti theory relies on is inappropriate with respect to the standard case of referential use, which makes the pragmatic theory preferable. This paper is a continuation of the cited one. Here I examine a number of non-standard cases of referential use and demonstrate that, with respect to them, Kaplan–Marti theory has no advantage over the pragmatic account either.
About the Author
E. V. Borisov
Institute of Philosophy and Law of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
BORISOV Evgeny Vasilyevich, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Associate Professor, Chief Researcher of Philosophy Department
Novosibirsk
AuthorID (RSCI): 278628
ResearcherID: T-3807-2017
AuthorID (SCOPUS): 56287727200
References
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Review
For citations:
Borisov E.V. Kaplan and Marti on definite descriptions: nonstandard cases of referential use. Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity. 2024;9(3):79-82. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2024-9-3-79-82. EDN: IGCIVU
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