Наказание (не)виновных?
https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2023-8-3-73-94
EDN: PXTLYW
Аннотация
В статье содержится критический анализ теории типов-токенов Марка Уокера. Данная теория призвана описать, объяснить и оправдать механизм, посредством которого морально-правовая ответственность может возлагаться на точные и полные дубликаты личностей. Однако защищаемый Уокером взгляд на личности как на абстрактные сущности наталкивается на ряд метафизических возражений. В качестве альтернативы на основе принципов агентского права разрабатывается новый подход к морально-правовой ответственности, в котором понятие виновного лица не требует тождества с лицом, совершившим виновное действие.
Об авторе
А. В. Нехаев
Омский государственный технический университет; Тюменского государственного университета
Россия
Россия
НЕХАЕВ Андрей Викторович, доктор философских
наук, доцент (Россия), профессор кафедры «История, философия и социальные коммуникации» ; профессор кафедры «Философия»; научный сотрудник Лаборатории логико-философских исследований Томского научного центра СО РАН, г. Томск.
AuthorID (SCOPUS): 57211853279
ResearcherID: M-7208-2016
г. Омск
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Рецензия
Для цитирования:
Нехаев А.В. Наказание (не)виновных? Омский научный вестник. Серия "Общество. История. Современность". 2023;8(3):73-94. https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2023-8-3-73-94. EDN: PXTLYW
For citation:
Nekhaev A.V. Punishing (Not)Innocent Persons? Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity. 2023;8(3):73-94. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2023-8-3-73-94. EDN: PXTLYW
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