The concept of a person
https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2024-9-2-141-145
EDN: UEPXBN
Abstract
The essay contains a critique of the metaphysical ways to use of the term ‘person’. Since the term does not designate any natural kind, philosophers must abandon the question ‘what constitutes the continued existence of a person?’. It’s just a bad question. All well-defined questions about identity (‘what is human animal identity?’, ‘what is human mind identity?’, and so on) should formulate only in terms of natural kinds.
About the Authors
C. McGinn
Jesus College, University of Oxford
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
Oxford
A. V. Nekhaev
Omsk State Technical University; Tyumen State University; Tomsk Scientific
Center, Siberian Branch, Russian Academy of Sciences
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Andrei Viktorovich Nekhaev, translator from English, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Associate Professor, Professor, Professor of Department, Research Associate
History, Philosophy and Social Communications Department; Philosophy Department; Laboratory of Logical and Philosophical Studies
Omsk; Tyumen; Tomsk
AuthorID (RSCI): 394939; AuthorID (SCOPUS): 57211853279; ResearcherID: M-7208-2016
References
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Review
For citations:
McGinn C., Nekhaev A.V. The concept of a person. Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity. 2024;9(2):141-145. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2024-9-2-141-145. EDN: UEPXBN
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