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Will I ever be a Cyborg

R. V. Cuhna

Trans. from eng. R. L. Kochnev, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Senior Lecturer of Philosophy Department, Tyumen State University, Tyumen

https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2023-8-2-106-115

Abstract

Eric Olson’s animalist view relies on the premise that person is not a fit candidate to be a substance concept, in Wiggins’s terminology. Instead, he claims, animal is what best serves as the answer to what we most fundamentally are and what determines our persistence conditions. Pro-posing a thought experiment concerning inorganic replacement, I aim to show that Olson’s animalist view cannot accommodate our very strong intuitions about such cases. My claim is then that animalism either fails on its own grounds or requires some tuning regarding what exactly an organism is and its persistence conditions. I will examine Matthew Liao’s attempt to accommodate such intuitions within an animalist view. I will also describe the basics about Olson’s animalist view but let us first look at the rough outline of my thought experiment. The essentials are as follows, the rest I will provide later, as we go along.

About the Author

R. V. Cuhna
Catуlica Porto Business School
Portugal

Porto



References

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Review

For citations:


Cuhna R.V. Will I ever be a Cyborg. Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity. 2023;8(2):106-115. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2023-8-2-106-115

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ISSN 2542-0488 (Print)
ISSN 2541-7983 (Online)